The UK’s five “noes” on EU economic governance. by Schammo,  Pierre
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
22 June 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Schammo, Pierre (2016) 'The UK's ﬁve noes on EU economic governance.', Company lawyer., 37 (7). pp.
201-202.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?productid=7056recordid=458
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in TheCompany
Lawyerfollowing peer review. The deﬁnitive published versionSchammo, Pierre (2016) 'The UK's ﬁve noes on EU
economic governance.', Company lawyer., 37(7): 201-202is available online onWestlaw UKor fromThomson Reuters
DocDel service.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
The UK’s Five ‘noes’ on EU Economic Governance 
 
 
Pierre Schammo
*
 
 
 
In February this year, David Cameron negotiated a so-called ‘new settlement’ for the 
UK within the EU.
1
 This agreement, which will only come into force if the UK stays 
in the EU, is supposed to strengthen the UK’s ‘special status’ within the EU. It 
includes, among other things, a section on ‘economic governance’. This section 
(hereinafter, the ‘Agreement’) is made of a series of provisions that are meant to 
ensure the co-existence between the UK and the Eurozone in the wake of the 
establishment of the Banking Union (BU) and further integration within the 
Eurozone. From a UK standpoint, the Agreement can be summed as follows:  
 
 ‘no’ to discriminatory treatment;  
 ‘no’ to ‘one-size-fits-all’;  
 ‘no’ to budgetary responsibility for the Eurozone;  
 ‘no’ to a loss of authority over the implementation of measures aimed at 
safeguarding financial stability; and  
 ‘no’ to a loss of say over EU decision-making. 
 
These ‘noes’ can be associated with particular grievances that the UK has been 
nursing, and attempting to address, for many years. Thus, at least since 2011, the UK 
has had concerns that closer integration within the Eurozone might open the door to 
discriminatory treatment of UK businesses: e.g. based on currency. Already in 2011, 
it had attempted to obtain safeguards from other Member States in return for agreeing 
to Treaty changes that would have buttressed fiscal coordination among Eurozone 
countries.
2
 The attempt failed, but in the following years it did secure safeguards in 
different legislative acts: e.g., in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories.
3
 In 2015, the UK also successfully 
challenged the ECB’s location policy which it viewed as discriminatory.4 Yet, despite 
the UK’s successes, the ECB’s attempt to implement its location policy continued to 
over-shadow the relationship between the UK and the Eurozone. The Agreement 
attempts to draw a line under this episode.  
The second ‘no’ addresses one of the UK’s traditional concerns. The financial 
crisis strengthened the EU’s resolve to achieve a level playing field in areas such as 
banking. The idea of a ‘single rulebook’, made of harmonized legislation, binding 
technical standards and guidelines, epitomizes this drive towards uniformity and a 
level playing field. However, the preference for uniformity does not square well with 
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the UK’s not uncommon preference for flexibility and discretion at the level of its 
domestic law. In 2011, it led the UK to attempt to secure a new voting arrangement 
from its EU partners: unanimity for maximum harmonization measures.
5
 Such an 
arrangement – controversial to say the least – would have offered the UK protections. 
However, unsurprisingly, the attempt failed and since 2011, the voices in favour of 
greater uniformity have only grown stronger. The Agreement offers the UK a degree 
of success. While it insists on the need for a level playing field, it acknowledges that 
rules might in the future need to be ‘conceived in a more uniform manner’ if applied 
by actors such as the ECB or the Single Resolution Board, than ‘corresponding rules’ 
that are applied by authorities outside the BU.   
The third ‘no’ – ‘no’ to budgetary responsibility (or perhaps better: ‘no’ to 
financial liability through the EU budget without appropriate mechanisms to ensure 
full reimbursement) – denotes an especially sensitive issue for the UK: the prospect of 
bearing financial liability because of financial assistance given to Eurozone Member 
States. Clearly the UK did not always get its way: in 2015, the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) was used in order to offer bridging finance to a 
Eurozone Member State (Greece),
6
 despite the UK’s opposition. However, the UK 
was able to secure some safeguards. They were subsequently implemented in Council 
Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 which now ensures that non-Eurozone Member States 
are compensated in case where a Eurozone country, which benefited from financial 
assistance under the EFSM, defaults.
7
  
The fourth ‘no’ – ‘no’ to a loss of authority over the implementation of 
measures aimed at safeguarding financial stability – stands for another sensitive UK 
issue. The UK has long been opposed to transfers of supervisory competence to EU 
bodies/institutions. In 2011, it attempted to convince other Member States that any 
such transfers in the prudential field should be subject to unanimity.
8
 It failed (again 
unsurprisingly). The Agreement now offers assurances, especially with respect to the 
supervision and resolution of financial institutions/markets and macro-prudential 
responsibilities.  
The final ‘no’ – ‘no’ to a loss of say – reflects the UK’s concern that the 
Eurozone might de facto agree legislative positions in informal settings such as the 
Eurogroup to which the UK has no access. The Agreement offers the UK a degree of 
assurance by inter alia calling on the Eurogroup to respect the Council’s powers. 
The Agreement hardly reflects new UK bottom lines. It is also hardly going to 
throw the Eurozone of its path. The Eurozone too got assurances by the way: e.g., the 
agreement ‘acknowledges’ in its opening paragraphs that the so-called ‘outs’ must 
abstain from creating obstacles and facilitate the process of deepening Economic and 
Monetary Union. But from an EU standpoint, there is nevertheless room for 
controversy: e.g., as far as the future of the single rulebook is concerned. Admittedly, 
the single rulebook is not a monolithic block of rules with no room for national 
options or national discretion. However, powerful institutions such as the ECB have 
been calling for more, rather than less, uniformity in recent years. The Agreement 
appears to signal a certain evolution in thinking by suggesting that Member States are 
ready to consider two-tier (BU/non-BU) arrangements. That said, the language used is 
vague. It remains to be seen whether any rethink of the single rulebook idea is going 
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to be substantial. Other parts of the Agreement seem rather difficult to monitor 
effectively: e.g. the question of whether the Eurogroup respects the Council’s 
authority. Indeed, the question of effectiveness must also be raised with respect to the 
Council decision on the effective management of the BU and the consequences of 
further Eurozone integration. This decision complements the Agreement. It 
establishes, according to rec (2), a ‘mechanism’ in order to ensure respect of the 
principles laid down in the Agreement as regards legislative acts that relate to the 
management of the BU or the management of the effects of further Eurozone 
integration. Like the Agreement, this mechanism is not specifically addressed to the 
UK. It benefits any Member State that is not part of the BU. The mechanism 
essentially seeks to avoid that a non-BU Member State is outvoted in Council in 
relation to legislative acts to which the Agreement applies. Thus, it is applicable 
where the Council adopts legislative acts (to which the Agreement applies) by way of 
qualified majority and the rules are subject to the vote of all the Member States. 
Specifically, in case where a (non-BU) Member State opposes a vote by qualified 
majority, the ‘mechanism’ provides that the Council shall ‘discuss the issue’ and 
attempt to find a ‘satisfactory solution’ to address the concerns. This formulation is 
not greatly improved by the requirement for the Council to ‘do all in in its power’ to 
reach a satisfactory solution ‘within a reasonable time and without prejudicing 
obligatory time limits’. One has become accustomed to ‘mechanisms’ and ‘systems’ 
as the EU’s language of choice for describing new institutional inventions in the 
banking/financial area, but on this occasion Member States just drew on an existing 
arrangement – see the declaration on Article 16(4) TEU and Article 238(2) TFEU9 – 
but with a new addition: the mechanism also envisages the possibility to escalate the 
issues to the European Council, but for ‘discussion’ only.  
Clearly, this mechanism does not offer the UK the unanimity requirement 
which it had hoped to secure in 2011. A veto for the UK would have been 
unacceptable. Unanimity would have taken the EU decades back. On the other hand, 
non-BU Member States are entitled to maintain an effective say in Council, as the 
Eurozone block continues on its closer integration path. The mechanism’s answer to 
this conundrum is to rely for its effective functioning on what Member States tend 
often to do anyway when issues arise: on a willingness to compromise. As such, the 
mechanism testifies to a typically European way of addressing issues. This might be a 
good thing for some Member States; whether it is a good thing for a more fractured 
EU remains to be seen.  
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